**SOC 3120 Social Psychology**

**Lecture Notes Classes 9-10**

**Individuality/Identity**

This week we will delve more deeply into issues that were implicit in our earlier discussions of the self: what is the meaning of individuality in social theory? What does it mean to have a distinct identity? Several works we examine today touch further on these related questions. First, the classical works of Mead and Simmel, by focussing on different issues, give very different answers regarding the possibility of social individuality. Second, Sheldon Stryker stakes out one side of this debate, developing Mead's position in a positivist direction he terms "identity theory." Next, Ralph Turner responds by asserting that we can identify our "real selves" with reference to our institutional-structural location or our interactional enactment of impulses, and that there has been a cultural shift towards the latter in recent decades. Finally, there is my own work on the cross-cultural conception of self, which attempts a theoretical synthesis of Mead and Stryker's formulations, along with Simmel's Kantian emphasis on form and content, and applies these to the differing selves exhibited in various cultural contexts.

**J.S. Kenney**

**"A Critical Comparison of G.H. Mead and G. Simmel's Conceptions of Individuality"**

In this brief paper, I attempted to compare the theoretical position of two of the classical theorists who have dealt extensively with the issue of individuality. I argue that Simmel and Mead's conceptions of individuality logically flow from their somewhat differing conceptions of the relationship between individual and society. Specifically, Simmel generally stresses a dialectical, not necessarily harmonious relationship, with an overwhelming emphasis on the operation of the developed individual in typical social forms. Mead, in contrast, emphasizes dialogue, cooperation, and socialization in the development of the individual self. Hence, Simmel's most general idea of individuality both within society and outside confronting it differs in emphasis from Mead's somewhat more "oversocialized" conception of an individual's own "unique pattern" and "standpoint" in the process and organized structure. Each will be discussed in turn.

Beginning with Simmel, one sees in any variety of social interaction a *distinction between, yet unity of* **form** (type of interaction) and **content** (individual interest, drive, or motive). Arguing that social and individual are "only two categories under which the same content is subsumed," Simmel asserts that "the individual is *contained* in sociation and, at the same time, finds himself *confronted by it*."

This dialectical interrelation or overlap between the concepts of individual and society leads Simmel to his conception of individuality. Positing a "differentiation drive" as part of the "content" in the individual participating in a given social form, Simmel argues that this receives satisfaction in two ways. First, it may be satisfied by the *contrast* of one's particular personality from the homogenous qualities of other members of one's social group. Secondly, it may be derived from *oneness* with one's fellows in a distinctive group.

While one's differentiation drive may be satisfied in either manner, this is essentially a zero-sum game whereby the more of one's sense of individuality one draws from one, the less one can draw from the other. Thus, Simmel conceives of individuals as "surrounded by concentric circles of special interests." All have a *double meaning* - those narrower defining their individuality as distinct from those wider (or more generic); those wider defining their collectivity in contrast to those narrower or more particular. There are thus two types of individuality according to Simmel: (1) that which emphasizes what individuals have in common; and (2) that which emphasizes what distinguishes them.

Simmel argues that the historical growth and differentiation of the circle associated with the first ideal of individuality (e.g. based on equality and freedom from constraint) eventually promoted the development of the second. This latter kind of individuality, which arises "out of comparison with others" and "the alternation of sensations, thoughts, and activities," is the basis for the sensation of a personal ego, as well as the form of autonomy where an individual an individual devotes "only the substantively relevant parts of their personalities to social bonds." Otherwise, the ego remains unconscious and fused with the group. Naturally, in this process of distinguishing oneself from others, "contradiction and conflict ...are operative."

This conception of individuality, which grew out of Simmel's dialectical, Kantian synthesis of form and content, can be criticized on several grounds. First, he does not discuss the development of individuals from childhood to adulthood, focussing instead on the experiences of adults already socialized to a minimum competence in a form of sociation. Secondly, he does not pay enough attention to the generation of meaning and self-identity in cooperative, harmonious interactions. Finally, he downplays emotions in relation to individuality in favour of rationality.

Moving on to consider Mead's work, here one sees a differing conception of the individual-society relationship leading to a different conception of individuality. Mead begins with how we become social beings, beginning in childhood. Beginning with the physiological bases (i.e. a central nervous system capable of delayed response and "fundamental socio-physiological impulses"), Mead emphasizes that "the turning back of the experience of the individual upon himself," and "the responses of individuals to the identical responses of others" form the essential conditions for the development of mind. Mead argues that mind, self, and society arise out of the social process of communication on the basis of gestures (especially language) that arouse in the organism universal responses of the same character as aroused in the other. In particular, the self is generated in this process of communication in two activities: (1) play; and (2) the game. In the first, the child takes the role of particular others and "organize in this way the responses which they call out in other persons and call out also in themselves." In the latter, "the child must be ready to take the attitude of everyone else involved." Interacting cooperatively on the basis of universal symbols which call out universal responses to particular stimuli, this latter form of role-taking broadens until the self takes in the "organization of the social attitudes of the generalized other or the social group as a whole to which he belongs."

It is out of this developmental process that arises the distinctive Meadian conception of individuality. This revolves around two basic ideas: (1) the "I" and the "me"; and (2) the unity and structure of the self reflecting the unity and structure of the social process as a whole, but from a unique standpoint.

While the "me" is unproblematically "the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes," we have already noted that there are many different interpretations of the "I." Here, suffice it to say that Mead introduced this "theoretical presupposition" to explain creativity, unpredictable conduct, and conflict. It may also be seen as the active component of the self that selectively analyzes and (sometimes) creatively synthesizes universal linguistic symbols and particular stimuli into hypothetical or manifest courses of action. According to Mead, depending upon whether one's self is dominated by the "I" or by the "me," one's individual personality either is "distinct" or "conventional."

With regard to Mead's second criteria of individuality, which analytically relates more to the "me," he argues that "the unity and structure of the complete self reflects the unity and structure of the social process as a whole." Yet, he does not feel that this is destructive of individuality because it "does so from its own particular and unique standpoint in that process."

Thus, in contrast to Simmel, Mead's conception of individuality derives from a developmental model which emphasizes socialization, dialogue, and cooperation. Several criticisms apply here as well.

First, Mead's emphasis on socialization, and his subsequent statements on individuality approach what Dennis Wrong has termed "the oversocialized conception of man in modern sociology." By terming impulses "social"; putting society analytically prior to the individual; stating that the self is "imposed from without"; asserting that social control is helpful to individuality"; and by formulating an adjustive conception of individuality almost wholly in cooperative social terms, Mead at least *approaches* an explanation that eliminates opposition between individuals and the groups into which they have been socialized. On his terms, there should be little conflict or self-presentation, but there is. In sum, Mead's "theoretical presupposition" seems more like a theoretical band-aid.

Secondly, his conception of the "I" is extremely ambiguous. Considering that it is one of the cornerstones of his idea of individuality, a clearer answer would have been preferred.

Third, Mead puts too much emphasis on harmony and cooperation in the triadic generation of meaning, the development of self, and social differentiation. One cannot help but get the sense that Mead, unlike Simmel, plays down the potential of conflict for contributing to individuality.

Finally, Mead, like Simmel, downplays the role of emotions in favour of rationality, and, in doing so, misses their role in socialization, dialogue, cooperation, conflict, and individuality.

Thus, Simmel's and Mead's differing views on individuality grew out of their contrasting conceptions of the relation of individual to society. Their relative emphases (i.e. dialectic/conflict/ operation vs. dialogue/cooperation/socialization) lie behind both their differing conceptions of individuality and the relative shortcomings of their respective theories.

**Sheldon Stryker**

**"Identity Theory: Developments and Extensions"**

In this paper, Stryker sets out the central ideas of "identity theory," a perspective that combines the thought of Mead and role theory, as well as having intellectual affinities with the Iowa school, Foote's conception of motivation and Smith-Lovin/Heise's work on emotion. The central proposition of identity theory asserts that "commitment impacts identity salience impacts role performance." Essentially, Stryker is arguing that identities are the subjective aspect of social roles ("internalized role designations"), and that these are ranked in a person's self in a hierarchy of importance ("salience"). Depending upon one's commitment ("identification") regarding these various identities, one's behaviour is determined in interaction. This formulation attempts to restate the traditional symbolic interactionist framework, which argues that self is the product of society and is in turn the prime determinant of social behaviour, in a manner that permits reasonably rigorous empirical test.

Thus, identity theory, beginning with the symbolic interactionist dictum that self is an emergent from society and organizes social behaviour, conceptualizes the self as a structure of identities organized in a hierarchy of salience. It defines identities as internalized sets of role expectations, with the person having as many identities as roles played in distinct sets of social relationships. The salience hierarchy is conceived as an ordering of those identities by their differentiated probabilities of coming into play within or across situations. Recognizing that persons enter many more or less distinct sets of social relationships, and defining commitment as the costs to the person in the form of relationships foregone were s/he no longer to have a given identity and play a role based on that identity in a social network, the theory predicts that the distribution of identities in the salience hierarchy will reflect the varying levels of commitment to the roles underlying the identities. Commitments, in turn, are seen to depend importantly on the "larger" structure of society, social organizational principles (e.g. class, age, etc.) that either facilitate or impede the entry of persons into and the exit of persons from social relationships. That is, the larger institutional, organizational, and stratification features of society enter the theory by influencing the formation, maintenance, and dissolution of social networks. Finally, the theory predicts that choices among behaviours reflecting alternative roles, when such choice is realistically possible, will reflect the differential location in the identity salience hierarchy of identities related to those alternatives.

This formulation attempts to respond to major criticisms of the interactionist framework over the years (e.g. re: social structure, difficulties testing hypotheses, etc). Nevertheless, from the standpoint of many symbolic interactionists, this attempt has not succeeded. For example, the introduction of social structural conceptualizations emasculates the fundamental processual thrust of the interactionist framework and its capacity to see human behaviour as emergent, creative, and constructed rather than determined.

There have been other criticisms as well from those more sympathetic to identity theory's positivist orientation. First, while positing the reciprocal relation of self and society, the theory undercuts this reciprocity by focussing so heavily on the directional influence of interactional structure on self and role performance, neglecting the reverse relationships. Relatedly, the mechanisms by which self impacts on role performance remain unelucidated and mysterious.

Finally, there are those who argue that this theory is too simplistic and insufficiently detailed to explain behaviour, and that other variables need to be added to make it workable.

Stryker states that this paper is an attempt to respond to all of these criticisms by developing and extending identity theory in new directions. He does this in four sections. First, in response to traditional interactionists, he discusses issues of "structure and process, constraint and construction." Next, he moves on to examine the "identity salience-role behaviour relationship." Third, he examines the "commitment-identity salience relationship." Finally, he discusses "emotions, master statuses, and personal traits." Each of these will be discussed in turn.

First, with regard to issues surrounding "structure and process, constraint and construction," Stryker notes that the concept of social structure disturbs traditional symbolic interactionists because it appears to deny the fluidity and constructed character of social experience, and because it seems to impose limits on human freedom and creativity. Stryker agrees that an *a priori* concept of social structure that appears to deny that potential, that imposes (variable) limits on the degree to which definitional processes can modify or transform patterns of social life is indeed objectionable. However, Stryker does not feel that this argument need be framed in terms of mutually exclusive alternatives, as some would have it. He argues that "using concepts of social structure does not imply acceptance of a total deterministic outlook...There is nothing illogical about viewing human social behaviour as importantly the consequences of constraining and sometimes coercive processes while recognizing that in principle those processes are open to denial, rejection, or modification. We can see social behaviour as constructed, at the same time recognizing that *probabilities* differ for various structural elements entering the construction and for various outcomes of the constructive process... That is all conceptions of social structure require, and all that is required as underpinning for a structural symbolic interactionism."

Under this formulation, then, "structure merely represents a recognition that the probability is high that extant lines of differentiation in a society affect particular people as opposed to other sets of persons, that some persons rather than others get together in particular situations to interact over particular issues with particular skills and resources...If some such conception did not enter analyses of social processes, we would in effect be asserting that interactional possibilities are unconstrained, that any process or outcome is equiprobable...The proper question is not whether human social behaviour is constrained or constructed; it is both. The proper question is under what circumstances will that behaviour be more or less heavily constrained, more or less open to creative constructions. (e.g. when the "working consensus" underlying social interaction, based on existing patterns of social organization, breaks down - making situations problematic).

Secondly, Stryker turns to consider the relationship of identity salience to role behaviour. There are two issues here: (1) the effect of identity salience on role behaviour; and (2) the reciprocal impact of role performance on identity salience. With regard to the former, Stryker asserts that there is empirical evidence showing that a major determinant of variation in behaviours in role is the location of the identity(ies) reflecting that role in the identity salience hierarchy. Essentially, identities seek validation, and motivate interactional performances whose function it is to reaffirm in interaction that one is the kind of person defined by the identities. It is likely that the more salient an identity, the more sensitive one is to opportunities that could confirm the identity. Moreover, the more salient an identity, the more likely is an individual to seek cues that a behavioural opportunity can be used to perform behaviours associated with the role on which the identity is based. High identity salience also increases, through the giving of cues, the number of "objective" opportunities to perform role behaviours (e.g. through the altercasting process).

With regard to the latter problem, the impact of role performance on identity salience, it is clear that we use what we do as the basis for drawing inferences about who and what we are. Our self-conceptions derive, in important part, from self-attributions made on the basis of observations of our own behaviour. This longstanding observation may be extended to the proposition that our observations of how we behave in situations leads to inferences about how salient (or important) particular identities are to us. Self esteem is the key element Stryker introduces here. Role performances are subject to self-evaluations by the performer, evaluations by others in interaction, as well as by significant others external to the performance. These evaluational processes are reflected in the person's role-specific self-esteem; and role-specific self-esteem is reflected in identity salience in accord with the principle that the higher the role-specific self-esteem attached to a role, the more salient the identity based on that role. The success or failure of our role performances will be of varying importance to identity salience.

Third, Stryker moves on to examine the commitment-identity salience relationship. He notes that in the past, the focus of identity theory has been on identity salience as a consequence of commitment. However, while evidence for this was available, analyses suggested that commitment be reconceptualized as being of two types: (1) interactional commitment, referring to the extensiveness of relationships that would be foregone were one to no longer play a given role; and (2) affective commitment, or the emotional costs attached to departure from a given role. The relationship between these two types of commitment is clearly complicated. When the two reinforce one another, when both are high or both are low, their joint impact on identity salience may be particularly strong (e.g. be sufficient to cause high or low identity salience). This seems to also hold when one of the types is high and the other is either in a neutral range or benign. However, when the two are in conflict there appears to be a problem, and the direction in which salience is affected depends most importantly upon whether persons, say, with high affective commitment see the chances for higher rates of interaction to be blocked, or those with low affective commitment somehow felt interactionally constrained to remain.

With regard to the reverse relationship - the effect of identity salience on commitment- there appears to be some evidence for this, but it is less clear and almost certainly less direct. It is likely that the motivational potential of identities again operates here. High salience likely will lead to efforts to join with others in settings in which the highly salient identity can be behaviourally enacted, or to increase the frequency of interactions in networks in which one is already a member. High salience can also be expected to lead persons to involve others with whom they interact in one arena of their lives in still other arenas of their lives, thus increasing the degree to which networks overlap. All of this increases both interactional and affective commitment.

In his final section, Stryker turns to a consideration of emotions, master statuses, and personal traits. These are conceptions which he intends to incorporate into identity theory to broaden its applicability and empirical fit.

Emotion, for example, has already been dealt with in the discussion of how self-esteem may enter the relations among commitment, identity salience, and role performance, as well as in Stryker's distinction between interactional and affective commitment. Stryker feels, however, that "there must certainly be other ways in which emotion enters the relations among the variables of the theory. One likely possibility is the way in which affect (emotion) enters the meaning of social objects, including self and others, in a motivational manner, as Heise suggests.

Master status refers to the structurally based attributes like sex, age, race, and social class that (a) derive from pervasive features of the social structure; (b) do not in themselves provide the grounds for specific networks of social interaction, and (c) enter the formation and interactional content of many of the specific networks of interaction in which a person plays a role. Virtually by definition, master statuses must be implicated in the processes by which identities impact behaviour.

This is also true for personal characteristics which have been called "traits" in the psychological literature. These include more or less pervasive styles of relating to the external world which surely affect patterns of relationships to others, and, as such, both the behaviours engaged in and, indirectly, the salience of various identities. More fundamentally, these may then enter the very structure of self.

Each of these elements, once incorporated into the general theoretical structure of identity salience, further help to account for behaviour that crosses individual interactional situations. Nothing in this trans-situational theory requires that self-concepts be limited to role-linked identities. The processes by which self develops can and sometimes do result in self-concepts organized around master statuses, personal traits, emotions, or some combination thereof, which can be most usefully viewed as impacting role-based identities and behaviours by modifying their salience and interactional meanings.

Thus, Stryker has essentially outlined a contemporary theory which attempts to dovetail a New Iowa school interpretation of Mead with role theory, Foote's concept of identification ("commitment"), Smith-Lovin and Heise's work on emotion, and a few other esoteric elements into a unified whole. On his model, individuality is basically a matter of one's own unique pattern of identities arranged in a particular salience hierarchy and situated in a unique interactional-structural context. With a few differences in terminology and emphasis, this is quite similar to Mead's position.

**Ralph Turner**

**"The Real Self: From Institution to Impulse"**

In this paper, Turner discusses the issue of how we recognize our real selves from a sociological perspective. His paper is divided into five parts. First, he asserts that each person develops at least a vague conception by which he recognizes some of his feelings and actions as more truly indicative of his real self than other feelings and actions. Secondly, he distinguishes between locating the real self in sentiments and activities of an institutional and volitional nature, such as ambition, morality, and altruism, and recognizing it in the experience of impulse - for example, in apparently undisciplined desires and fancies and the wish to make intimate revelations in the presence of others. Third, he argues that there has been a long-term shift in this identification in favour of impulse, which has intensified in the last decade or so. Fourth, he draws from analyses of contemporary society to suggest four theoretical approaches that might explain this shift. Finally, he asserts that many sociological theories, especially those having to do with social control, take for granted selves with institutional self-anchorages, and thereby need revision in line with this shift toward impulse.

Turner begins by noting that the idea of a self as object permits one to distinguish among the various feelings and actions that apparently emanate from one's person. Some of these one recognizes as expressions of one's "real" self; others seem foreign and staged. In commonsense reasoning, behaviours thought to reveal the "true" self are also ones whose causes are perceived as residing in the person rather than the situation. One takes little credit and assumes little blame for the sensations and actions that are peripheral to one's real self. Others are of great significance because they embody one's true self, good or bad - a self that is deeply personal in a proprietary sense, characterized by possessiveness, privacy, and sacredness. Of course, because, in interactionist terms, the self is an object in relation to other objects, all of which are constantly modified in dynamic interrelationship, the bases for bounding the self necessarily change when folk understandings of psychology change.

Now according to Turner, the relationship between self and social order is highlighted by the observation that, to varying degrees, people accept as evidence of their real selves either feelings and actions with an *institutional* focus or ones they identify as strictly *impulse* (a parallel with Freud's distinction between id and superego). He gives the following example:

"To one person, an angry outburst or the excitement of extramarital desire comes as an alien impetus that superficially beclouds or even dangerously threatens the true self. The experience is real enough and may even be persistent and gratifying, but it is still not felt as signifying the real self. The true self is felt in acts of volition, in pursuit of institutionalized goals, and not in the satisfaction of impulses outside institutional frameworks. To another person, the outburst of desire is recognized - fearfully or enthusiastically - as an indication that the real self is breaking through a deceptive crust of institutional behaviour. Institutional motivations are external, artificial constraints and superimpositions that bridle manifestations of the real self. One plays the institutional game when he must, but only at the expense of the true self. The true self consists of deep, unsocialized, inner impulses. Mad desire and errant fancy are exquisite expressions of the self."

Turner next goes on to outline several crucial differences between these two contrasting loci of self:

1. Under the institutional locus, the real self is revealed when an individual adheres to a high standard in the face of serious temptation; to impulsives, it is revealed when a person does something solely because he spontaneously wants to;

2. To impulsives, the true self is something to be discovered; to those with an institutional focus, it is something to be attained, created, or achieved;

3. Under the institutional locus, the real self is revealed only when the individual is in full control of his faculties and behaviours. Under the impulse locus, the true self is revealed only when inhibitions are lowered or abandoned;

4. Hypocrisy is a concern of both types, but the word means different things to each. For institutionals, hypocrisy consists of failing to live up to one's standards. For impulsives, hypocrisy consists of asserting standards and adhering to them even if the behaviour in question is not what the individual wants to do and enjoys doing. The institutional goal is correspondence between prescription and behaviour; the goal of impulsives is correspondence between impulse and behaviour: hypocrisy in either instance is a lack of the appropriate correspondence;

5. The qualities that make a performance admirable differ as well. The polished, error-free performance, in which the audience forgets the actor and sees only the role being played, is the most admired by institutionals. Impulsives, in contrast, find technical perfection repelling and admire instead a performance that reveals an actor's human frailties;

6. The self as impulse involves a present time perspective, while the self as institution revolves around a future time perspective;

7. Individualism means different things to institutionals and impulsives. In a very broad sense, an individualist is one who rejects some kind of social pressure that threatens his true identity - but there are different kinds of pressure. To an institutional, social pressures can divert a person from achievement, from adherence to ethical standards, and from other institutional goals. To an impulsive, individualism can be a repudiation of the institutional and social claims that compete with impulse.

Before closing this part, Turner notes that both institution and impulse loci allow for individualistic and non-individualistic orientations. He finds it useful to employ a cross-cutting distinction between individual and social anchorages for the self. Institutionals may stress either achievement, a relatively individual goal, or altruism, a social aim, as the road to self discovery. Impulsives may individualistically stress the simple disregard of duties and inhibitions in order to gratify spontaneous impulses, or they may seek self-discovery socially through expressing potentially tabooed feelings to other persons in order to attain a state of interpersonal intimacy transcending the normal barriers between people.

Turner also urges us not to confuse this distinction with self-presentation and matters of alienation, nor to take these polar types too literally. "Specifying polar types such as these is merely a way to start thinking about variation in the sense of self. Except on the fringes of society, we are unlikely to find the extremes. Elements of both probably coexist comfortably in the average person. Yet, differences among groups of people in key facets of self may be of sufficient importance that their experience of each other...(means that ) little communication can occur."

Now that he has elaborated the differences between the two loci of self, Turner goes on to discuss what he sees as a contemporary trend: "over the past several decades substantial shifts have occurred away from an institution and toward an impulse emphasis." Many of the same features have already been associated with the youthful protest if the 1960's, but it would be shortsighted, in Turner's view, not to see the shift in a more extended historical context. "A revolutionary consciousness often unwittingly adopts perspectives that have been growing in established society.." He notes, for example, prior changes in literary themes where "the characteristic element in modern literature is the theme that "we must accept the reality of those human impulses that were judged unacceptable by an artificial and unreal civilization." He also points to how Freud's greatest impact was to "discredit normative behaviour and conscience as manifestations of our true selves and to elevate impulses to that position." This is coupled with a concern for the discovery of the true self, which became a prominent theme in youth movements, minority movements, and the women's movement during the 1960's. Child-rearing practices stressing impulses, business practices stressing the need for human relations-engineering, and significant changes in answers to Kuhn's twenty statements test ("C" mode responses articulating feelings, tastes, and desires now displacing "B" mode ones stressing institutional roles and statuses) all suggest that something is afoot. Indeed, Turner states that "consistent with this evidence is the contemporary view that, on meeting a stranger, it is inappropriate to ask where he comes from, what he does, and whether he is married, or to categorize him in other ways. Instead, one seeks to know him through his tastes and his feelings."

Now that he has identified the two loci of the real self, discussed their differences, and identified this historical shift, Turner turns to various theories and explanations for this trend. He identifies four alternative explanations rather than advance a single theory of self focus. Each will be dealt with in turn.

First, Turner refers to the idea of changing cultural definitions of reality. Arguing that people experience as real what they are taught is real, he asserts that a cultural shift may have occurred in recent times. Conceptions of reality are buttressed by systems of belief, and the decline of overarching religious belief and its replacement by cultural diversity, relativism, and materialistic or naturalistic belief could assign more reality to physiological and allied psychological impulses. "No longer the locus of real behaviour because they cannot be taken for granted, institutional frameworks begin to seem arbitrary and artificial." Still, Turner feels that this explanation accounts more for a decline in the institutional locus than for an increase in the impulsive one.

Turner's second explanation turns from culture to the fundamental terms of interpersonal relations. Turner argues that the human meanings of experience come out of the sharing and exchange of experiences. We tend to believe in experiences we share with others and doubt those we cannot share. From this perspective, self conception should incorporate those actions and feelings that are involved in exchange with others, and, through exchange, contribute materially to the individual's integration into groups. Noting that, as production problems were increasingly resolved, there has been an historical shift in the Western world away from the organization of group life around production and mutual protection to organization around consumption. Turner argues that this shift towards consumption resulted in a decline in interpersonal orientation towards achievement, altruism, and righteousness and an increase in focus on pleasure, personal tastes, distinctive psychological "needs," and expressive activities.

Turner's third explanation revolves around matters of deprivation and desire. He argues that sustained denial of any goal or impulse causes a preoccupation with the blocked tendency which makes the latter seem more real and important. Modern urban, industrial civilization requires a great deal of control and suppression of impulse. If these requirements have increased, the result should be enhancement of the sense of reality associated with impulse. If modern civilization has also frustrated mankind's need for interpersonal response, it is easy to understand that people may experience their longings for intimacy as manifestations of their real selves. Alternatively, it may be that modern society is not so much repressive as it is contradictory, stimulating to an unparalleled degree the impulses whose expression is then inhibited. Turner is not satisfied with this explanation, noting that "if this is true of the impulses Freud would have lodged in the id, it is equally true of achievement and service motivations that he would have placed in the superego. To some extent this entire approach may rest on a mythical conception of uninhibited life in preindustrial societies."

Finally, Turner gives his fourth explanation in terms of opportunities and consequences. He argues that "lines of action with plainly perceived and significant consequences are experienced as real, while ones with undependable or unidentifiable consequences seem less real. Consequences cannot be experienced without opportunity, so the reality of particular goals and impulses is enhanced by either augmented consequences or increased opportunities." Turner gives the example of rites of passage, which have declined in vitality, and no longer incorporate distinctive privileges, responsibilities, and skills, such that, nowadays, "each of life's milestones turns out to be of little moment." The same is true of the once-popular belief in self-discovery through self-sacrifice and surrender, which is dependent on the "assumption that one has been absorbed into a caring, gratifying entity, both powerful and dependable...It is this rich return for surrender that vests the institutional self-conception with a vital sense of reality. The discovery of self in love for another is made real by the reciprocated love, the dependability of the relationship, and the new opportunities for gratification that come from the relationship. The discovery of self through immersion in an institutional framework is real when the dependability of that framework makes the world predictable and the rich body of objects opens up a new world of gratifications. But if this reciprocation does not occur, neither does the vital sense of a real self. When the institutional framework is characterized by disorder and undependability, when it fails as an avenue to expanded opportunity for gratification, the true self cannot be found in institutional participation." In the meantime, moreover, mass society has opened up opportunities for an augmented range of impulse gratification.

Turner notes that he has "by no means covered all plausible approaches to explaining the hypothesized shift in self anchorage...Nor am I prepared to recommend a choice among theories." Instead, he seems to favour a combination of deprivation theory and opportunity theory, where relative deprivation in the face of changing opportunities for gratification is the key. Turner argues that "just as competition may increase the interest in work of both winners and losers and a healthy anxiety enhance the excitement of love, the combination of accessible gratification and some degree of risk may create the most vital sense of reality. Individuals today may experience their impulses as more vital expressions of self than heretofore, because opportunities to gratify impulse have increased and norms against doing so have weakened, at the same time that lingering inhibitions from the past and contradictory cultural definitions add an increment of risk to the expression and pursuit of impulse."

In the final section of his paper, Turner turns to consider the theoretical implications of this shift in the real self for sociological conceptions of social structure. Indeed, he feels that this may negate the implicit assumptions on which some sociological theories are founded. For example, "theories deeply rooted in the past often take for granted an actor who locates his real self in an institutional setting. Conflict theories are no different than order theories in this respect." Turner suggests how alternate loci of self bear on a few major concepts in sociology.

For example, Turner castigates role theory as assuming that role behaviour is monitored and evaluated on scales of role adequacy. This ignores, for example, Goffman's conception of role-distance, where, instead of embracing and enacting roles to the hilt, self-presenting individuals ward off identification with a role that does violence to their self-conceptions. The former is more characteristic of an institutional loci of "true" self; the latter with an impulsive. This, according to Turner, is probably not universal, but "a distinctive feature of societies like our own in which the locus of self is widely found in noninstitutional impulses."

Secondly, Turner discusses the relevance of this shift to sociological conceptions of norms and values. He says that these are "largely the same phenomena viewed in different ways. Honesty is a value; ' thou shalt not lie' is a norm. But the two are inseparable." They are two constructions an individual can place on the same phenomenon. Which construction is foremost in his experience makes important differences in his relationship to social structure. Self as impulse tends to transform the institutional order into a set of norms, all cramping expression of the true self. Self as institution subordinates the normative sense to a set of values, such as integrity, piety, patriotism, considerateness, and the like."

Third, Turner discusses sentiments. He says that choice of one's cues for telling genuine from false sentiment reflects one's anchorage of self. "Self as impulse can feel love as genuine, as a true reflection of self, only when it arises and persists as a spontaneous attachment, untrammelled by promises, covenants, and codes of behaviour. Sentiment is not helped along by a facilitative social order: it erupts in spite of the order and threatens it...Institutionals, on the other hand, understand love as something that requires effort to attain and preserve. The infatuation that explodes impulsively is undependable and unreal."

Fourth, Turner discusses the meaning of ritual, asserting that the locus of self must be closely intertwined with the ability to gain a vital experience from engaging in collective rituals. It is not a simple matter of institutionals finding meaning in ritual and impulsives not, since many people have been, and continue to be moved deeply by participation in collective ritual. "Ritual is the prime symbolic vehicle for experiencing emotions and mystiques together with others - including a sense of oneself as sharing such emotions." In the place of traditional forms, there have arisen new rituals that participants experience as spontaneous outpourings instead of institutional routines (e.g. in New Age religions). Under these circumstances, "it is doubtful that there is any poverty of ritual today in those forms that increase the vitality of an impulsive view of self."

In closing this final section, Turner argues that each of these foregoing points bears on the theory of social control. Concern with the prestige of one's role and the esteem that goes with high role adequacy buttresses the institutional structure. A sense of value eases the pathos of conformity with social norms. Social sentiments domesticate potentially disruptive emotions yet preserve their sensed vitality and spontaneity. And through collective ritual, group solidarity and dedication to the institutional structure are continually renewed. But all of this depends upon the individual's feeling that his real self is engaged in these experiences. If he finds that self elsewhere, control can only be instrumental. Yet, those who find their real selves in impulse "become susceptible to social control from that quarter. "We need a theory of social control that relies more extensively on the creation and manipulation of situations and on symbiosis than on the internalization of norms and values."

In the end, Turner says that while this polarity between real self conceived in terms of institution or impulse is important, most individuals will seek both kinds of anchorages. For much of life, these alternate anchorages will exist in fairly easy accommodation. But, at crucial transitions in the life cycle the coexistence will be interrupted. The latent opposition between institutional and impulsive selves then becomes manifest, figuring strongly in the turmoil of choice. Sociologists writing from a structural perspective may miss much that is important if they do not recognize this other dimension.

**J.S. Kenney**

**"The Varying Structure of the Self Across Cultures:** **A Preliminary Analysis"**

In this paper, I attempt to integrate Mead's concepts of the self and symbolic universals with more recent developments in identity theory and cross cultural analysis in order to map out a more detailed general model of the social self. First, I outline three general theoretical dimensions of the self. Next, I elaborate Mead's concept of "universals" is elaborated in relation thereto - particularly with regard to their organizational functions. Finally, I conclude with a preliminary analysis of differences in the structure of self across cultures using Durkheim's concepts of organic vs. mechanical solidarity as a guiding metaphor.

To begin, then, I have identified three interlocking and interdependent dimensions of the social self in the literature. First, there is Mead's conception of the "I" and the "me," on which I place Lewis' Chicago-school interpretation of the "I." Since this is formed through taking the role of particular others until it eventually takes in the "generalized other" of an individual's society as a whole, I refer to this as the "lateral" dimension. Secondly, there is that dimension of the self as presented by Stryker's identity theory, which I refer to as the "vertical" dimension. This conceptualizes self as a *hierarchical* ordering of identities, defined as internalized role designations, into a structure of salience. Or, as Mead put it, each of the "elementary selves" so ordered reflects the various aspects of social structure encountered by the individual. Finally, there is a fundamental moral dimension, which is suggested by theorists as diverse as Durkheim, C.H. Cooley, Jack Douglas, and Norman Denzin. This dimension asserts, in the words of Durkheim, that "we are moral beings to the extent that we are social beings."

Now, assuming that Stryker's concept of "identity" overlaps with Mead's "elementary selves," (each of which may be further broken down into the various I/me dyads and social objects relating to a particular role as defined by the generalized other), a clearer picture begins to emerge. Combining Stryker with Mead, the self may be viewed as a combination of various creative I/me components, organized in a hierarchy of internalized role designations, based on commitment to various interactional relationships in the social structural network. Of course, morality, cross-cuts and interpenetrates each of these. In interaction, one or several of these identities may be in play at a given time, and each action taken will constitute an "I" that will soon become integrated into the individual's role specific "me," leaving, in most cases, the other "dormant" or "irrelevant" aspects of the complete self unaffected.

Now, it is well and fine to set out three analytical dimensions of the self, but, without discussing what organizes them - and how - the above is merely a question-begging exercise in description with no logical underpinnings. The beginning of the answer to this question is to be found in Mead's concepts of meaning and of universals - both of which are intimately related to the generalized other. As we have seen, Mead talks of meaning originating in the triadic relationship between symbolic gesture, adjustive response, and the resultant of the social act. In this process, recognition of a symbol always implies something that can be discovered in an indefinite number of objects. In other words, it exhibits a universal character. As Mead put it "in any habit which answers to different stimuli, the response is universal and the stimulus is particular." Mead feels that our symbols are all universal "we always assume that the symbol that we use is one which will call out in the other person the same response." It is these universal symbols, with their attendant meanings calling out certain responses, that are here asserted to structure the three dimensional self described above. Four considerations help to understand the organizational mechanism at play.

First, all symbols have an effect on perception of the world, particularly in our understanding the implicated relationships of various concepts to each other (e.g. brother to sister and family; private, public, mine and yours to property). Second, organized sets of symbols colour our perception of the world, enabling us to pick out certain elements in the environment and see them as particular things in an organized manner (as Mead puts it, such "attitudes determine the environment"). Third, it is important to note that this process of perceptually associating words and attitudes with phenomena in the world is largely habitual and unconscious in the sense that we do not automatically consider alternative ways of perceiving and responding to symbolic stimuli. Finally, such universal symbols enable us to identify "this as leading to that," helping us to pick out the particular characteristics of the situation so that the *appropriate* response to them can be present in the experience of the individual. In sum, the meaning of symbolic universals habitually structure our perceptions of the world and our responses thereto.

Now, when the three dimensional model of the self discussed earlier is brought back into the picture, the importance of the above considerations becomes clearer. Referring specifically to the vertical dimension where the generalized other (and internalized self-identities) are subdivided into a hierarchical ordering of role-identities, it can be argued that particular social situations or objects will unconsciously call out certain universal responses, but not others. The appropriate response (the "me" existing in the moral dimension) will be perceptually associated (through symbolic universals) with a role-identity occupied (or emerging) in the individual's self, but not with others, before becoming manifest in the individual's actions as an "I." For example, if a person is asked out on a date, the appropriate response would be unconsciously associated symbolically with one's self in one's roles with regard to marital status and dating. It is unlikely, however, that it would be automatically or necessarily associated with one's role as a worker on a production line.

Basically, it is being asserted that these perceptual symbolic universals unconsciously structure the *boundaries* of the appropriate response to particular social situations. Responses which would be absurd in a particular social situation are automatically excluded, leaving a *range* of evaluatively appropriate responses based on past similar interactions. Of course, these also exclude responses that would be appropriate in one symbolic universe but inappropriate in another (e.g. in parts of Germany it is considered a sign of appreciation when guests belch following a meal. Anglo-Saxons, in contrast, would consider it terribly rude).

Essentially, then, what will be termed *perceptual beliefs* categorizing subject matter and types of social relationships structure the *form* of a role, while *evaluative beliefs* (i.e. attitudes comprising morally appropriate responses bases upon past interactions in one's role-set) provide the *content*. Together, these are subsumed under the larger category of the generalized other, which, on the above, they map out.

Of course, the "me's" found in some roles may be based on more frequent interactions and contain larger role-sets than others (e.g. the role of child, in most cases, only admits of two parents, while the role of employee may involve may co-workers, both subordinates and supervisors). This opens the possibility that not only is there an internalized salience hierarchy of subject matter (or form) *between* roles, but also a content hierarchy of role-others and evaluatively appropriate responses *within* most roles (e.g. one's respected boss may be more important than one's boorish fellow employees, but neither may be more important than one's parents and spouse. Moreover, treating one's boss with he same intimate affection as one's family would be - in most cases - an inappropriate response in our society).

These then, are the basic organizing principles underlying the three interlocking dimensions of the self. Taken together, symbolic universals in their perceptual aspects structure the generalized other along a vertical hierarchy of categorical, structurally related role-identities - each of which contains an evaluative content built up through interactions with individuals in that particular role-set.

Now that these matters have been cleared up, it is time to briefly consider how they may be theoretically applied to the problem of variation in the self across cultures. Interpreting Durkheim, I argue that in the traditional societies idealized in his structural concept of "mechanical solidarity," the simple division of labour, high social cohesion and relative similarity between individuals is reflected in symbolic universals. The degree to which similar perceptual and evaluative beliefs are diffused throughout the population is high, as is commitment. The collective authority of these beliefs is close to absolute, often due to their highly religious and/or moral nature. Moreover, not only are they frequently difficult to disconfirm in experience, their high social support makes them powerful adjuncts to perception and action.

However, in societies structurally approaching Durkheim's "organic solidarity," the situation differs. In these "modern industrial societies" where social organization is premised on an extensive division of labour and the interdependence of dissimilar individuals and groups, the degree to which similar beliefs are general throughout the population is lower, as is overall commitment. There are usually more diverse ideologies and systems of belief floating around, thereby making the collective social influence of any one outlook on perception and action weaker compared to those in more traditional societies. Disconfirmability, both logical and social, is therefore much more likely in these settings.

Arguing from these premises, it may be that the relatively simple institutional role structure found in societies approximating mechanical solidarity, generally coupled with powerful and extensive beliefs in personal deities and an emphasis on, as well as the reality of, large extended kinship networks, would have an effect on the structure of the self therein. Specifically, there would be fewer institutionally delineated roles, but the content of appropriate responses in each would reflect more kinship-based role-others and less diverse beliefs.

Societies reflecting Durkheim's organic solidarity, on the other hand, would involve a greater variety of perceptual and evaluative beliefs, a more complex institutional role structure, and a relative breakdown of extended kinship ties within the institution of the family. This would mean that there would be more institutionally defined roles whose moral content is generally based on interaction with more diverse role-others, and reflecting more diverse, less integrated beliefs.

In short, the self in societies approximating mechanical solidarity is likely to predominantly reflect kinship-based roles, integrated beliefs, and *interpersonal complexity*; those approximating organic solidarity to reflect more complex institutional roles, diverse beliefs, and more diverse individuals associated with each appropriate response. *Institutional complexity* increasingly organizes interpersonal complexity.

While I do not have time here to extensively discuss my empirical application of this model, I note that I applied it to the following cultures:

(1) Hunter-gatherer societies (as exemplified by the !Kung bush-people of the Kalahari);

(2) Agricultural societies (as seen in the Yanomamo people of South America);

(3) Indigenous societies undergoing modernization (the Kwakiutl people of coastal British Columbia);

(4) Japan;

(5) India; and

(6) Traditional vs. modern China.

Taking the first three examples, it became apparent that the !Kung fit neatly into this schema of the institutional simplicity but interpersonal complexity of societies approximating mechanical solidarity. The Yanomamo, an agricultural society with a more complex division of labour, showed a somewhat more complex and hierarchical institutional role and self structure, but still a great deal of interpersonal complexity (e.g. their focus on complex and detailed kinship networks). Finally, when one comes to Kwakiutl society, one sees a culture once comprised of a simple division of labour and few institutional roles being superseded by Western culture. As such, one sees many individuals experiencing anomic conditions, and the simultaneous (and not always easy) coexistence of Western institutional roles and a traditional aboriginal focus on interpersonal complexity.

As for the latter three examples, Japan, India, and China illustrate how perceptual and evaluative beliefs act as the guiding metaphor to the structuring and understanding of identity, but somewhat calls in question the use of Durkheim's model as well. In Hindu India, selfhood is dominated by the metaphysical idea that there is only one true self in existence, such that all aspects of the empirical self are merely superimpositions on the true one. Moreover, the empirical self is traced through a long line of ancestors to a divine predecessor, and this is what is considered more important than the empirical self. These ideas are further reflected in the legitimation of the rigidly hierarchical caste system, and the proper expected behaviour of each, as well as in the ability to disregard empirically contradictory beliefs and behaviour as that of an unimportant illusion. Essentially, the perceptual and evaluative content is relatively uniform, kinship networks (spiritual and empirical) still predominate, and there is little anomie because these beliefs are not disconfirmable in experience, and thus highly adaptable to either agrarian or the modern industrial division of labour. Yet, this adaptability is of concern. To the extent that the traditional Hindu self has, through periods of colonization, industrialization, proselytizing, and development, continued to be profoundly structured by these underlying perceptual and evaluative beliefs, it may be that dissimilarity and interdependence does not necessarily result in confusion or doubt in the traditional underlying beliefs structuring the self.

In Japan, a different set of perceptual and evaluative beliefs guides the structure of self. Like in India, there has been no traditional value placed on individualism, yet the beliefs underlying the self differ here in their orientation: family duty and exemplary example as opposed to metaphysical transcendence. In such a social environment self becomes highly bound up in role identification. One is a father, a brother, a son, etc. - not an individual apart from these. Role has become reified in Japanese society. The high cultural value placed on hierarchical mentor-subordinate relationships, duty, self-sacrifice, team work, and belonging in every aspect of life suggests that there is a relatively uniform evaluative content pervading all roles - so much so that proper role behaviour - and roles - sometimes take on more importance than the people who fill them. With modernization, these ideas were merely extended to the workplace such that there is still a relatively uniform set of perceptual beliefs organizing the evaluative content of each role, regardless of the varying interpersonal content. This adaptability of traditional ideals in the face of increasing social complexity and interdependence again stands in stark contrast to Durkheim's thesis.

In China, by contrast, similar traditional perceptual and evaluative beliefs regarding the self as a centre of social relationships based in Confucian filial piety, endurance, and spiritual development of "heaven-endowed" nature have been forcibly disrupted since the communist takeover in 1949, particularly during the cultural revolution. This has resulted, at the very least, in a bifurcation of self-concept between those alive before the revolution and those brought up since. This attack on traditional beliefs, introduction of opposing communist ideology, revolutionary violence resulting in survival-oriented action, the breakdown of extended kinship systems, and rapid industrialization has resulted in a more individualistic, assertive, institution-bound, and "self-centred" self among the younger generation. The increased multiplicity of beliefs and the growth of institutional roles have not only begun the move toward a more Western-style social structure and self (i.e. more institutions/fewer kinship based members of one's role-set), they also signal the beginning of Western anomie.

Summing up, then, I attempted in this paper to forge various concepts of the self and social structure into a theoretical model enabling an empirical review of the self in cross-cultural contexts. Basically, by viewing the self as containing three interlocking dimensions - the *lateral* (generalized other); the *vertical* (hierarchically arranged role identities relative to social structure, perceptual and evaluative beliefs, and role sets); and the *moral* (the all pervasive evaluative content of each role) - it has been theorized that societies coming closer to Durkheim's concept of mechanical solidarity are interpersonally complex and relatively uniform in their perceptual and evaluative beliefs. On the other hand, those approaching the concept of organic solidarity have more institutionally complex role structures that organize interpersonal complexity, combined with much more variation in perceptual and evaluative beliefs across roles.

Only this latter point regarding uniformity and diversity of beliefs in modern industrial societies has been called into question by the data (e.g. Japan and India). Indeed, it is mainly in China where structural disruption, forced industrialization, and ideological education in the name of a Western political ideology enables one to see anything approaching this theoretical prediction.

In the end, by reviewing both social structure and cultural beliefs in a wide variety of societies, the foregoing has not only begun to show how the self reflects social structure, but how perceptual and evaluative beliefs structure the self. I hope that this preliminary work leads to further research, debate and discussion on how the self varies both across time and across cultures.